ABSTRACT. At the start of the Second World War, British policies restricted rubber planting in Nigeria's Benin region. After Japan occupied Southeast Asia, Britain encouraged maximum production of rubber in Benin. Late in the war, officials struggled with the planting boom that had occurred. The war was a period of both continuity and change. Producers gained experience and capital. Forestry policies restricting planting survived, and output quality continued to occupy officials after the war. The colonial state was hindered by a lack of knowledge and resources, and by its pursuit of conflicting objectives in giving incentives to both producers and traders.
INTRODUCTION
The Second World War brought economic upheaval to sub-Saharan Africa. The Allied drive for rubber production in Nigeria's Benin region was no exception. Before 1942, the Colonial Office worried Nigerian rubber undermined British interests in its other rubber-producing colonies, and discouraged planting. After the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, the "battle for rubber" began, and Britain sought maximum production of wild and plantation rubber in Benin. Once it was clear the war would be won, the government fought to contain the unexpected boom in wartime planting. In this paper, I provide a narrative of rubber production in Benin during the Second World War.
Benin's wartime rubber production is a window into two issues. First, the importance of the Second World War for African economies is not settled. Many colonies faced government controls, scarce imports, inflation, forced labour, and conscription. 2 The war initiated the "second colonial occupation" of greater intervention in African economies (Killingray and Rathbone, 1986; Meredith, 1986) . There is, however, no consensus on whether the war was a watershed. While Londsdale (1986) claims the war altered the balances of economic and political power in Kenya, Anderson and Throup (1985) trace these changes to earlier trends. Martin (1989) situates the war in a longer African depression. Recent work, then, identifies both continuity and change. The Malawian agricultural extension service, for example, revised its strategies and scale after the war, but not its aims and policies (Green, 2009) .
In Benin, the war brought continuity and change. Direct restrictions on tree planting were undermined. Firms became familiar with rubber, and continued the trade afterwards. Farmers gained experience and the position of smallholders was solidified. Conversely, forest reservation had hindered planting before the war and remained afterwards. African smallholders produced the low-quality grades that were most profitable, and the Nigerian government could not alter their behaviour during or after the war.
Second, this episode sheds light on the limits of the colonial state. Lacking resources and blinded by prejudices and misinformation, colonial governments relied on local elites (Berry, 1993; Phillips, 1989) . This made economic change risky (Meredith, 1975) . Projects failed due to inadequate preparation and overconfidence (Hogendorn and Scott, 1981) . Colonial states were hobbled by pursuit of conflicting objectives. The goals of raising living standards, securing raw materials, and supplying a market for manufactures often clashed (Meredith, 1975) . Colonial Office responses to economic problems were piecemeal. The war heightened these difficulties. Economic isolation and government controls created interest groups that sought to retain wartime rents (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007). These challenges of economic management echo difficulties faced by other wartime economies (Broadberry and Harrison, 2005; Offer, 1989) , by British rubber promotion elsewhere (Bauer, 1948; Hurstfield, 1953) , and by Soviet planners (Spoor, 1993; Pomfret, 2002) .
In Benin, the state lacked knowledge and struggled to provide incentives to both producers and traders. Many interventions harmed producers, and the state found its decrees resisted or opportunistically used. The state contended with conflicting interest groups. I use archival sources to produce a "thick description" (Geertz, 1973 ) of their motivations. The Colonial Office, initially concerned Nigerian rubber would harm other colonies, pivoted to focus on maximum production after the loss of Southeast Asia. The Government of Nigeria pursued contradictory aims of improved living standards in Nigeria and raw materials for Britain. Specific departments had divergent objectives; the Forestry Department's mandate to preserve forest resources was inconsistent with the Agriculture Department's promotion of African agriculture. African smallholders and labourers pursued their own interests while expatriate trading firms and rubber estates focused on profits. My description is chronological. This makes the narrative intelligible and allows me to highlight processes of continuity and change, while drawing attention to the challenges faced by the state at each point.
BACKGROUND AND SOURCES
The Benin and Warri Provinces of colonial Nigeria dominated smallholder rubber production after the war. This region contains the former Kingdom of Benin and the western Niger Delta. During the war, the government encouraged production of timber, rubber, rice, fruits, cocoa and vegetables (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 152-179) . My sources are records from the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK) and the National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI). I also rely on records from the Oba's Palace in Benin City (OPA) and semi-structured interviews. 3 Rubber in Benin came mostly from two sources. First, wild rubber from the native Funtumia elastica was usually exploited by mobile gangs of tappers. Funtumia occurred sparsely enough that it might take several days to gather one pound of rubber (Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 223) . Funtumia could only be tapped a few times per year. 4 Second, planted rubber came mostly the Hevea brasiliensis. This was introduced from Brazil in 1895 (Anschel, 1965, p. 49) . Hevea surpassed Funtumia in plantations after 1914 due to its higher yield, better wound response, and more rapid growth. Hevea matured in seven years. Smallholdings were often tapped daily after the war (Blanckenburg, 1963 , p. 21), excepting a "wintering" period during which trees could not be tapped. Rubber was collected by cutting grooves into the bark and allowing the latex to flow into a container such as a snail shell. This latex was then coagulated, rolled into thin ribbed sheets, and smoked. Apart from these "ribbed smoked sheets," Nigerian rubber was generally lump or crepe. Lower-quality lump was less labour-intensive, produced by simply cleaning the coagulated latex. Lumps and poor-quality sheet could be re-milled in order to produce crepe rubber.
AMBIVALENCE AND RESTRICTION, 1937-42 Ambivalence
The Colonial Office was initially concerned with whether African production could undermine quantity restrictions imposed by the International Rubber Regulation Agreement, hurting other rubber-producing colonies. In 1940, the Colonial Office remarked on Nigeria's "striking" increase in rubber exports, and asked the Nigerian government for a report on planting. 5 Officials felt Nigeria was typical of colonies outside the agreement, "naturally parasitic on the scheme." 6 The Colonial Office had additional concerns. Firms such as the British Bata Shoe Company (Bata) and the United Africa Company had leased African holdings for tapping. 7 These leases circumvented Britain's policy of preventing non-Nigerians from obtaining permanent interests in land. 8 This, officials feared, could undermine the control exercised by local chiefs who were essential to indirect rule (Phillips, 1989) . Bata began buying hides, cotton and rubber in Nigeria during the 1930s, and its leases amounted to some 50,000 trees by 1940 (Hlavkova, 2007) . The Colonial Office had heard that the United Africa Company wished to lease all African rubber in the country. 9 Several of Nigeria's "large number of small and widely scattered" African plantations had been leased just before the war. Some 11,000 trees in the Eastern Provinces and probably more in the Western Provinces had been let out. 10 By contrast, the Nigerian Agricultural Department did not wish to harm the industry, due to revenue concerns and the depressed state of trade. The Government claimed the industry was "of substantial value to the African planter," as the price for palm produce had remained depressed through the 1930s. 11 The Agricultural Department believed rubber slowed the destruction of forest cover, converted un-cleared bush into valuable 4 growth, and could stand a high export duty. 12 It was difficult to explain to producers why palm oil was promoted despite low prices, while rubber was ignored. This case was strengthened by the loss of Axis export markets. Agricultural Department policy was "neither to encourage nor to discourage rubber production but to give advice and assistance to farmers when asked." 13 This included instruction in laying out plots, tapping and preparation, provision of planting material, and allowing some planting in forest reserves. The Government of Nigeria supported this position, and the Colonial Office agreed.
Restriction
Despite this stance, coordination was imperfect across government departments, and two policies actively discouraged planting. First, forest reservation set land off limits to planting and was selectively and corruptly enforced by local agents such as Forest Guards. Similar reserves in other British colonies were meant to favour the colonial timber industry and benefitted the state through royalties and preservation of strategic raw materials. Reserves covered half to two thirds of Benin Division on the eve of the war (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha, 2009, p. 4; Usuanlele and von Hellerman, 2009; Usuanlele, 2003, p. 112-145) . These interfered with planters who, under "customary" rules, could plant anywhere in Benin. For example, one farmer wrote in 1945 for a stay of execution on an order to destroy his rubber in the Okomu Forest Reserve. His conviction for farming illegally had been upheld by the District Officer, even though his trees were twelve years old, and the District Officer himself recognized that forestry authorities knew of the planting and should have taken action earlier. 14 These restrictions also checked the growth of large holdings by powerful interests. In 1921, the Commissioner of Forests refused an application from the Oba (the traditional ruler and head of the Native Authority) to extend his rubber plantations in the Ogba and Ologbo Forest Reserves, on the grounds that further clearing of trees would restrict water flow into the Ogba River. 15 The United Africa Company, similarly, found that the government would not consider a rubber plantation in Sapoba Forest Reserve in 1937. The District Officer felt that, since the Oba held the land on behalf of the people of Benin, it would be a "gross breach of trust" to lease it to a firm for a rubber plantation. 16 Because of the state's limited capacity, enforcement was delegated and weakly supervised, creating opportunities for corruption. The allegation made against one colonial employee in 1940 illustrates this. 17 A timber contractor accused a Forest Guard, of aiding a man accused of illegally farming in the Ohosa Reserve to escape to Benin City and evade prosecution. Similarly, a petitioner complained in 1941 that a Native Authority agricultural assistant had come to the village of Idale and "corruptly demanded" and received money from the rubber planters "in the name of the Government". 18 The second policy limiting planting was the Permanent Crops Order, passed in 1937. The Agricultural Department, fearing tree crops were locking up land needed for food crops, pushed the Native Authority to take this action (Rowling, 1948, p. 6 ). Futher, the Oba opposed the appropriation of communal lands for private plantations (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 146-7) . Under the order, no one was to plant any tree without the permission of the Village Council. 19 Applicants required signatures from the odionwere (chief) and Oba.
At first, petitions were received objecting to the order, mostly in response to what the District Officer believed was "false propaganda" emanating from planters' associations that the Permanent Crops Order was a scheme to gather information that would be used to collect taxes. Once this was quashed, the order became popular. 20 In the first few months of its operation, hundreds of applications were received and approved, with the permits being treated as titles by the farmers (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 107) .
Enforcement was delegated out of necessity, and so the order was unevenly enforced. It was used mostly against non-villagers, especially those living in Benin City. Few local planters had bothered to obtain a permit, and planting by these men went on unrestricted (Rowling, 1948, p. 6 ). In 1941, complaints of discrimination from urban residents were received. 21 The District Officer recognized these had a basis in fact, but that enforcement would require a costly and possibly corrupt staff of inspectors. 22 At a meeting in 1940, the Commissioner of Forests noted that permits under the Permanent Crops Order had been issued covering land enclosed in Forest Reserves. Recipients were, in some cases, prosecuted. 23 By 1941, a backlog of applications was apparent. 24 The Permanent Crops Order in Benin did not, like forest reservation, survive the war. Forest reservation was in the interests of timber companies whose goals did not change. The Permanent Crops Order was an attempt to guard smaller farmers against privatisation of communal lands. Their response to these fears, however, was to appropriate land for themselves (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 249-254) . The pressures that came with the war made the contradictions in the Permanent Crops Order too heavy to bear.
MAXIMUM PRODUCTION, 1942-44
The drive for rubber production Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia had accounted for more than 80% of global rubber production before the war. 25 purchases through the London rubber market. John Holt & Co. was, for example, unable to acquire tyres from Firestone's South African branch unless they supplied an equivalent quantity of unmanufactured rubber. 26 Thomopulos, a firm owned by Greek expatriates, was similarly refused a license to export 100 tons of rubber to South Africa. 27 Nigeria was called upon early in 1942 to achieve "maximum output of rubber both plantation and wild." 28 Three days after a telegram to this effect was received, circulars were issued by the Agriculture and Forestry Departments. Two weeks later, another circular was sent with instructions on finding and preparing wild rubber. Several others followed over the course of 1942-43. 29 These departments offered instruction to officers and to Native Authorities, whose employees trained locals in production. Three inspectors of produce and twenty five produce examiners in the Western Provinces were trained in the preparation of Wild Rubber in April 1942, and similar training was conducted at Benin and Aba. 30 Some of the European staff of the Agricultural Department devoted more than half their time to rubber at first, and many African staff were fully employed in rubber. 31 By May, wild rubber was sold at the local buying stations, or "canteens." 32 Projections for the 1943-44 season anticipated that roughly 22% of Nigerian production would come from the formerly German "Cameroons Plantations", 20% from the United Africa Company's Pamol holdings at the Jamieson River in Benin and near Calabar, 1% from the J.A. Thomas estate at Sapele and 27% from the smallholders concentrated in Benin, Warri, and Owerri. 33 The remainder would come from wild rubber -20% Funtumia produced in the Western Provinces and 13% vine rubber from the middle belt, Cross River, and Cameroons. 34 Exports for the period 1937-1947 are given in Table 1 and Figure 1 . Export statistics show that wild rubber made up 25% of Nigerian exports in 1942, 29% in 1943 and 11% in 1944 before falling below 2% at the end of the war. 35 Later in 1942, the Forestry Department took over the drive for wild rubber, leaving the Agricultural Department responsible for plantation rubber. 36 This required reviving an industry abandoned decades earlier, of which only a few old inhabitants had experience, and for which written records were sparse. 37 The Forestry Department established buying organizations and erected smoke houses. 38 forty six others had been engaged as rubber demonstrators and propagandists. 39 School teachers were instructed to guide children in collecting rubber during their holidays. 40 One consequence was destruction of Nigeria's wild rubber. By the end of 1944, wild rubber output was declining. 41 The 1945 report of the Agricultural Department admitted that "trees were worn out and vines destroyed. But the object was achieved, wild rubber being produced when the shortage of rubber was most acute."
Rubber took priority over other Agricultural Department Work. 42 There were hundreds of small plantations to deal with, some no bigger than a garden. 43 By May 1942, the Agricultural Department believed tapping on these Hevea farms was reaching full capacity. 44 In July, the Agricultural Department began to survey Hevea plantings in Benin Province. 45 The government encouraged tapping on Sundays, and shortening the annual rest period that workers used to visit their families. 46 Girls were trained by the Agricultural Department to assist smallholders in collecting latex, picking scraps, and other tasks. 47 Native Authorities (local governments), including the Benin Native Authority, assisted in buying. Lorries toured outlying villages each month. Native Authorities also trained rubber graders, organized tapping, established processing stations, supplied tapping knives, rollers, climbing ropes, and other equipment, and built smokehouses. 48 A "Rubber Challenge" was organized for districts to compete in production. 49 
Africans' experiences
Though the terms of trade for most Nigerians fell, rubber producers fared better; import prices between 1940 and 1944 were 80% higher than they had been from 1935 to 1939 (Martin, 1989, p. 90) , while the price of RSS 1 sheet in London rose 97% over the same interval (International Rubber Study Group, 2000) . Even so, Africans found the battle for rubber intrusive. Production efforts conflicted with other wartime policies that raised labour costs. Farm owners and communities with wild trees were called upon to lose money tapping their resources or risk seeing their property confiscated. Residents (senior Provincial officers) were enabled in 1942 to order the exploitation of trees or vines that were not being tapped. 50 Owners were given two weeks in which to show cause why their rubber should not be turned over to others for tapping. Agricultural staff reported farmers who refused to tap trees; about 200 warnings were issued to farmers in 1943 (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha, 2009, p. 11) . Compensation was to be paid only if the authority saw fit.
For smallholders, these notices came as a shock. One owner complained that the person who reported his rubber was untapped did so maliciously. 51 Another wrote that he was tapping his rubber, but was told that the three young boys he employed were insufficient, when eight to ten men would be needed for full production. 52 Others complained that their plantations had been turned over to alternative tappers with no notice given. 53 Wild rubber was treated similarly. In 1942, the people of Egoro were given permission to exploit untapped Funtumia on the Kukuruku side of the district boundary. 54 Similarly, the Ekpoma people were given permission to tap rubber in the Erra district, and the Uzen clan was given similar rights in Jagbe. 55 Africans resisted. Individuals served with notice would begin tapping, only to soon abandon it. 56 At Ujogoa, farmers refused to show their plantations to production assistants. Assistants not accompanied by policemen lacked authority. 57 Labour shortages explain why farmers left their rubber untapped. Many men had left for the army or for large estates around Benin, Sapele and Sapoba. With labour diverted to food production after the failure of the yam crop, farmers in Esan in 1943 were not able to obtain labour at 10s per month, the wage they stated they could pay. 58 Further, producers faced monopolistic buyers who often cheated them. Ex-scale prices were routinely ignored, and administrative officers and forestry staff did little to protect producers. 59 Because up-country buyers feared reprisal from their parent companies if rubber was de-graded further down the supply chain, the firms most active in the wild rubber trade were those with only a few offices and free from fear of their superiors. Others offered prices one or two grades below what was actually bought. 60 The Elders of Ekpoma, in Esan, complained that the United Africa Company clerk there had offered a price below the official one and turned them out, refusing 200 sheets of rubber. 61 He was later found weighing small parcels on scales designed for larger amounts, and "calmly" informed the District Officer that he rounded weights down to the nearest whole pound. 62 Several producers refused to sell to local representatives of the commercial firms unless an administrative officer was present. 63 Middlemen, knowing they would face deductions at the buying centres, took these out of the prices they paid producers. 64 Larger planters coped by combining into organizations, directly importing equipment, and directly exporting rubber (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 162-3) .
Producers faced outright scams and a rising cost of living. The "Rubber Health Maintenance Co" in 1944 fraudulently took money from plantation owners. 51 Representatives of the company issued notices that they had the right to inspect and treat plantations, threatening farmers that if they did not permit their plantations to be treated they would be prosecuted. 65 Costs of living and nominal wages had risen during the war (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 153 ). There was a shortage of supplies such as formic acid and wire gauze used to prepare latex. 66 Smallholders' demands for equipment were not treated favourably. When asking for assistance in acquiring knives and gauze, they were told that locally produced knives were excellent, and that latex could be adequately strained using raphia in a perforated tin. 67 Farmers who asked for price increases were scolded that their cost of production was no more than 4d per lb, that "they were among the very few people to whom the war had brought abnormal profits," and that they were the only rubber planters in the empire not subject to excess profits tax. They were warned not to press for a revision that might go against them. 68 Farmers complained that tappers and transport were scarce and that their views were not forwarded beyond the production office. 69 The war prompted Hevea planting, despite only slight government encouragement. 70 While officials believed this was an ill-informed price response, pressures towards land appropriation intensified during the war (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 163) . By 1948, some 25% of Benin Division was under rubber (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 161) in holdings ranging from "a few trees planted at random" to several hundred acres. 71 The state confronted new planting in 1942. While officials supposed a large area of rubber in Malaya would be destroyed, they thought it was too early to consider long term projections. 72 The Resident of Warri Province did not believe an acute land shortage was likely, but the possibility should be kept in mind. The people themselves were, in his view, mostly uninterested in the question. 73 Other officials worried synthetic rubber would pose a threat after the war, or that labour spent planting was diverted from production. 74 The matter was dropped without a decision.
Challenges for the government
The state began the war unsure what could be expected for Nigerian rubber production. Both pre-war exports and early twentieth century figures century were used as guides. 75 Surveys were initiated to determine the whereabouts of untapped trees. The Agricultural Department investigated stocks of coagulants and equipment. In 1943, T.J. Cumming and W. Richards were sent to West Africa as an expert "Rubber Mission" to investigate production. 76 The Government of Nigeria was instructed that rubber of "any shape or form" was wanted, even rubber that washed up on the coast. 77 Investigations were launched into the suitability of several untested species for rubber production. 78 The government had to satisfy the conflicting incentives of expatriate trading firms and African producers. An early challenge was establishing a system of inspection and grading. Initially, unofficial grading was carried out at the request of firms. In July 1942, new grades and prices were drawn up. 79 These were adopted on a trial basis after consultation with representatives of the territories in Africa. 80 The Association of West African Merchants complained that local buyers could not follow these grades, since no simple accurate tests for adulteration or moisture were available. 81 Several shipments had been downgraded in the UK. Local agents were generally disgruntled by mid-1943. 82 They did not trust their UK representatives or the Rubber Trade Association in London to make specifications that were comprehensible in West Africa. 83 The Governor proposed a simplified system that collapsed several grades together, allowing deductions for adulteration and moisture. 84 This recognized the limited skills of colonial staff and local agents of trading firms. Similar suggestions were made by Daarnhouwer and Company and the Association of West African Merchants. 85 The Rubber Control feared that these simplifications would lead wild rubber to be purchased at the lowest price, discouraging production. Multiple grades based on adulteration and moisture content had been intended to discourage adulteration and ensure producers received compensation related to f.o.b. prices. 86 The Ministry of Supply adopted an alternative proposal, under which shippers were relieved of responsibility for discrepancies between the contracted quality and what arrived in the UK, though those consistently shipping below the contracted grade could be removed from the list of approved shippers. 87 By July, the grading scheme in Nigeria had been simplified, though not to the degree desired by the Governor.
The remoteness of rubber production and coordination problems within the Colonial Office made changes difficult. The Rubber Mission found many up-country buyers were unaware of the Rubber Control's quality guarantee in 1943. Others were suspicious of its powers to take action against shippers. 88 In July, Colonial Office representatives met with the Association of West African Merchants to discuss the possibility of inspection by the Produce Inspection Department, a second grading at the ports, and bulked shipping. Negotiations collapsed when the Rubber Control stated it would not accept the second grading as final. 89 remained until the end of the war. Government Produce inspection began on October 1, 1943. 90 Trading firms were initially unfamiliar with rubber and wary to become involved in it. 91 Their inexperience helps explain the absence of a system of firm-enforced quality grades like that in Malaya (Huff, 1993) . Unanticipated losses in weight meant that firms were "buying their experience." 92 Further, import controls raised costs. In October 1942, Bata complained that the differential between the ex-scale and f.o.b. prices was not sufficient to meet expenses. They claimed that packing, overhead, transport, bank expenses and depreciation cost them 1.52d per lb, while the difference between the f.o.b. price net of duty and the ex-scale price was only 2d. Employees at the company's Nigerian stations were demanding a cost of living allowance that would cause Bata to lose money on rubber. 93 The government and the Rubber Mission were not convinced the trading firms were innocent. The government believed shipments were often delayed for local agents to await instructions from their head offices. The United Africa Company, for example, temporarily suspended shipments in July 1942. 94 The Rubber Mission accused firms of giving little attention to supply board notices and failing to consult Forest Officers for advice. 95 In January 1943, Paterson Zochonis had ceased buying, owing to the loss made on their first shipment, while C.F.A.O. refused to purchase certain grades. 96 Several firms had ceased buying at many of their canteens in 1943. 97 Where firms could save money by producing low quality rubber, they did. Many shipments arrived below the contracted grade. Shippers demanded maximum prices for cases shipped without a declared grade. Other cases were shipped as flake, on which no export duty was charged, only for shippers to demand higher prices when these were found to contain sheet on arrival. 98 One official proposed removing the duty on rubber as an "obvious solution," but was ignored. 99 Officials chastised clerks in Esan for refusing to buy certain types of rubber in 1944. 100 Ensuring participation by African producers also proved difficult. Pamphlets written in English were unsuited to illiterate or non-English producers and Forestry staff. 101 High prices were not sufficient -"incentive goods" had to be made available for Africans to buy. In 1942, the government sought to obtain a variety of these under Lend/Lease, mostly household goods and hardware. 102 In Esan, gunpowder was an incentive good. 103 The Rubber Mission worried that higher rubber prices enabled producers to live by working less, raised prices of scarce luxuries, and encouraged producers to hoard rubber in anticipation of higher future prices. 104 After subsidies in remote areas had been a "complete failure," these fears appeared confirmed. 105 Officials debated whether further price increases would raise production. 106 In 1942, the duty on rubber was raised to 2d per lb. The United Africa Company believed this particularly discouraged Africans, whose product fetched lower prices per lb. 107 The quality of rubber produced by Africans was seen as a problem by the government. The proportion of high grade rubber fell throughout the war. 108 Africans added resinous latex to their rubbers that could not be detected outside a laboratory. 109 Shipments arrived in the UK containing pieces of wood or palm kernels. 110 Much of the rubber arrived tacky, and articles made from it perished quickly. For Funtumia, this was because of overheating during preparation and the practice of drying rubber in the sun. 111 The Rubber Mission was impressed by smallholders' "unnecessary large proportion" of low grade rubber. 112 While capable of higher grades, farmers were satisfied with the profits from lower quality rubber. The Mission saw coagulated latex rolled into balls and dried over a fire on a permeable platform exposed to the sun. This became tacky, would not dry properly, and could lose half its caoutchouc content before reaching the UK. 113 Tree scrap was thrown in the same container as bark shavings and sold for whatever price it could fetch. The mission found one farmer with an idle rolling machine in his store; the effort needed to improve quality was not worth the better price. 114 Buyers did not help. Bata graded one or two grades above what was offered to them. 115 This was a policy pursued in other countries before the war to increase market share. During the war, it undermined the supply of usable material. It created rumours of corruption, as other firms suspected Bata had a preferential relationship with the Rubber Control. 116 Though inspection was introduced in 1943, there were no regulations banning adulteration until 1945. The Bata agent at Benin purchased unexportable rubber with the intention of creping it at Sapele. He surrendered 37 tons after it proved impossible to process. 117 At buying centres, agents placed rubber on sheets of corrugated iron in the sun in order to reduce moisture. This made it tacky. 118 In 1944, a Bata buyer near Ekpoma was storing "considerable quantities" of steadily-deteriorating lump rubber on an earthen floor, while Thomopulos' agent was holding a large amount of sheet that was growing mouldy. 119 Rubber packed in hessian became tacky, adhered to its packaging, and was difficult to clean. Talcum powder for dusting was not available. 120 Ground snail shells used as a substitute harmed the rubber. 121 The sole European representative of Thomopulos in the Benin and Warri provinces defended a bad shipment on the grounds that it was impossible for him to personally supervise the buying stations, so that it was left to the company's African employees. 122 Although rubber could be creped to remove moisture and refuse, there were only two creping plants available in West Africa. 123 Even this small capacity was not fully used. The creping batteries owned by Pamol and Thomas at Sapele were only worked two to four hours a day on the off-grade rubber produced on those plantations. It was not profitable for the firms to crepe bought rubber at the scheduled prices. In the summer of 1942, Thomas had lost £372 creping 36.82 tons it purchased. 124 By July 1944, Pamol's creping battery was obsolete and Thomas' broke down frequently. 125 In 1946, the rollers were glass smooth and succeeded only in embedding dirt more firmly in the crepe after repeated passes. 126 
The estate sector
Apart from former German holdings in the Cameroons, estates in Nigeria were mostly in Benin and Warri. 127 These were the properties of Pamol Ltd, the J.A. Thomas Estate, and the plantation of I.T. Palmer. 128 Thomas and Palmer were both Africans. These varied markedly in size; the Rubber Commission anticipated that Pamol would produce nearly 1,500 tons of rubber over the 1943-44 season, while Thomas would produce only 80. 129 Production increased smoothly on these. By October 1942, intensification presented few problems, and growers were "going all out." 130 Palmer faced the most difficulty. A "worn out property," tapping cuts were made wherever bark remained. 131 Other estates were exempt from grading, while Palmer was intentionally excluded after the manager was dismissed and took legal action against the company. 132 After the war, management remained "chaotic" due to a personal feud among the directors, labourers had left without due notice, and workers at Sapoba went on strike after non-payment of wages. 133 Estates struggled to maintain labour supplies during and after the war. The war brought a new period of labour agitation; employers believed workers had only developed grievances after the industry became important to the war. 134 Workers on the United Africa Company's Jamieson River estate staged a two day strike in January 1944. They demanded a cost of living increase and a war bonus, in part because they erroneously believed workers at Sapele had received similar increases. 135 A meeting with the manager resolved this temporarily, but in February workers' delegates asked that money no longer be withheld as surety for tapping utensils. 136 In May, an additional strike was launched and seven workers were tried under the Defence Regulations. 137 In 1944, the government launched an inquiry into conditions on African plantations. These were "so notorious" that many workers from Esan and Kwale were unwilling to accept employment except in Government or European concerns, necessitating recruitment from Iboland, Umuahia, and more distant areas. 138 Typically, employees on African plantations worked from April until February, returning home during the period when the trees could not be tapped. 139 Generally, they were only paid "ration money" until the end of the year. A worker who left early surrendered all arrears. The Labour Officer objected that estates could thus dictate terms, worsen living conditions, and take advantage of illiterate labourers who had could not record the amount owed them. 140 Though he believed workers' hours were reasonable, their wage of 3½d per day was "ridiculous." African planters feared the government would impose minimum wages. Set too high, these would make rubber unprofitable. Labourers would not be motivated, they argued, unless they were paid by results. Further, desertions were already frequent, and changes would make it easier for other employers to entice deserters rather than recruiting workers themselves. 141 These problems survived the end of the war. In 1946, the United Africa Company's Jamieson River estate was grossly overcrowded. 142 At Palmer's Sapoba estate, the main camp was overfull, susceptible to rain, in disrepair, with a single usable pit latrine and poor kitchens. 143 At Palmer's Kwale estate, workers lived in mud houses, and the dispensary assistant was a former gardener without training. Workers were discontent over their cost of living allowance. 144 Many labourers left rubber for timber after price controls were removed in 1946. 145 When 67 workers were let go from the United Africa Company in November 1948, they demanded repatriation and leave pay. The manager asked for police protection. 146 After a strike of the roughly 190 workers at Palmer's Kwale estate, an inspector reported on the conditions there. Tappers worked some 46.5 hours a week, while the factory boys put in 70 hour weeks. 147 Wives had been employed at 7d-8d per day for farm work, but were dropped as this was unprofitable. Many workers were juveniles under the care of elder employees. Absenteeism was high, as workers were torn between the estate and their own farms during peak seasons. No overtime was paid. Labour was fined "almost recklessly." The nursery school had been closed, and the nearest market was seven miles away. With no reserve fund, labour was often paid late after the rubber was sold.
THE END OF THE WAR, 1945-48
The return to a free market At the end of the war, the state lacked resources to smoothly manage the return to a "free market." Despite the opening of the Far East, it was forecast in December 1945 that demand would continue to exceed supply. The exception was low-grade rubber, and the Colonial Office sought to end its collection as rapidly as possible. 148 The Board of Trade discontinued rubber purchases at the end of 1946. Private trade was restored on January 1, 1947. This operated under exchange control, ostensibly to curb speculation. By 1948, a decline in Nigerian production had begun. 149 In August 1947, the export duty was removed to alleviate the worst hardship for producers, and import duties on some inputs to rubber production were waived. 150 The system of grading again became a challenge. Firms such as Bata had shown that a trade in low-grade rubber could be profitable, undermining attempts to improve quality. 151 Shippers were informed that, after the clearance of stocks held on March 15, 1946, several low quality grades would no longer be exportable. 152 The Board of Trade wanted Nigeria to operate according to Rubber Marketing Association grades. The Governor did not believe it would be possible to train the African personnel of the Produce Inspection Department to recognize the small differences between these categories, especially as Nigerian rubber was produced by a multiplicity of smallholders, varying in quality and appearance "not only from sheet to sheet but often as between one part of a single sheet and another." 153 He proposed a simplified system for Nigeria that was meant to continue the wartime system. 154 Though the Association of West African Merchants opposed continued grading by African inspectors that they believed was not credible in England, 155 the Governor prevailed, and government inspection and grading continued. 156 Other issues complicated the post-war transition. Only three days notification were given for the cancellation of price schedules, leaving firms unable to buy until the new prices were known. 157 Wild rubber subsidies were cancelled with no prior notice. 158 During 1946, "Bata Nationalised Industries," Bata's nationalized Czechoslovakian former affiliate, sent two representatives to Nigeria. They attempted to entice employees away from Bata, take over expiring plantation leases, and acquire stocks at inflated prices. 159 Because formic acid was scarce, it was nearly impossible for smallholders to produce high-grade rubber in early 1947. 160 The United Africa Company, after using its stocks for its own plantations, had no acid to sell to others. 161 Order in Council 26 of 1946 imposed a minimum wage of 10d per day for trained workers on rubber plantations. This was not binding on European estates, which paid 1s to 1s 3d per day. 162 In December 1946, African planters complained that they could not pay this, asking for a suspension of the order until prices improved. Unlike European firms, they were unable to supplement their incomes through profits on imports. Most officials were unsympathetic, proposing short grace periods, 163 arguing that the minimum wage would weed out the most inefficient firms, 164 or that it only imposed a light burden. 165 Enforcement, however, was suspended throughout 1947 and 1948 as the supply of acid did not improve. 166 By September of that year, it was clear the order would be impossible to enforce except on larger estates. 167 In September 1945, the Agricultural Officer recognized that production work was not improving quality and proposed these activities be ended. 168 In October, almost the entire rubber staff was dismissed, with four assistants retained until the end of the year to distribute sieves and acid. 169 As smallholders became increasingly predominant, quality continued to decline. 170 They possessed limited knowledge, had little machinery, used "dirty methods of production" and frequently let out their plantations to others. 171 Correspondence on these interdependent difficulties of low wages, low prices, and low quality continued into the early 1950s. 172 
Planting and restrictions
Throughout 1944, the Colonial Office re-considered planting restrictions. Officials feared land was planted to rubber at the expense of food crops, and that the industry could not survive international competition. 173 Even before the war, global capacity had exceeded consumption, and synthetic rubber would make competition particularly severe. The Colonial Office did not believe in complete prohibition, but was willing to consider allowing planting only in certain areas. 174 The Agricultural Department, similarly, believed price fluctuations and the lack of an internal market made rubber unsuitable for Nigeria. 175 Others within the Ministry of Supply worried labour and training costs would be the greatest problems. 176 The Agricultural Department opposed legislative restrictions on planting. The only precedent was the Permanent Crops Order, which had "not been particularly successful". 177 Before the war, producers had been willing to export so long as ex-scale prices were not below 3d per lb, and so they might weather post-war competition. 178 The policy that emerged was gradual price reduction and propaganda discouraging planting. 179 The government diverted its efforts, unsuccessfully, to improving quality.
In Benin, the balance eventually fell against revival of the Permanent Crops Order. In 1943, the Oba and Council forbade all planting after the end of the 1943 season. The District Officer sent a memo to all councils telling them that "this restriction of rubber planting is for your own good, in a few years' time the price of rubber will again be very low, and if you have used all your farm-land for rubber you will have neither money nor food ... Tap all the rubber you can now, and save some of the money to make palm plantations after the war." 180 The ban was lifted in 1944 (Usuanlele, 2003) . The end of the war and food shortages in 1945 and 1948 re-opened discussion (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha, 2009 ). Planters continued to resist these restrictions, for example by concealing young trees. 181 In 1946, the Agricultural Officer noted the difficulties in enforcing restrictions when extension staff combined duties of "policeman" and "farmer's friend." He suggested that a uniformed corps of inspectors be created. 182 Four of the thirteen agricultural inspectors were converted to inspectors of permanent crops. 183 The government also considered using the Permanent Crops Order to appropriate illegally-planted land in order to test the effect of rubber on later food yields. This was never undertaken, due to concerns about fairness and legality, and because agricultural assistants were not prepared for data collection. 184 By 1948, the Permanent Crops Order was a dead letter (Rowling, 1948) . In 1951, no information on the Permanent Crop Inspectors had been received since 1949, and there was no evidence that attempts were being made to enforce the order. 185 In Warri, new regulations were implemented based on the Permanent Crops Order in Benin. In 1944, the Senior Resident expressed alarm about the area planted to rubber. 186 The Aboh and Kwale Native Authorities had made rules prohibiting planting permanent crops without their permission, reserving the best yam-growing land for food crops. The Itsekiri Native Authority had made a similar rule. Other restrictions were put in place after the war in Ora, in the Ika clans, and at Ogwashi-Uku (Rowling, 1948, p. 19-33) .
Like restrictions before the war, these were opportunistically enforced. While Aboh and Kwale had passed the first restrictions, they did not enforce them until a food shortage scared them into pursuing convictions in the second half of the year. 187 The District Officer for Aboh reported in 1946 that "very large numbers of people" had planted "enormous quantities of rubber (for a fee paid to the Okparuku etc), without any reference to the District Officer." 188 Inadequate staff made it impossible to keep the position in check. In Kwale, the District Court resisted prosecution of illegal planters, arranging that cases be adjourned until the District Officer went on leave. 189 The District Officer guessed that ten times as many individuals as had received permits had been planting surreptitiously, hiding their plantations by leaving bush between them and any major path or stream. 190 When a count of rubber plantations was extended to reserved areas, it was taken by planters as if it were registration. One inspector was driven out by a planter in the prohibited area at Abedei on the grounds that the government had ordered all land to be planted with rubber, and that he was trespassing on the planter's private land. The District Officer in Kwale, like his counterpart in Aboh, also advocated a full ban on further planting.
Agents of the Forestry Department were, as before the war, accused of corruption. 191 H.I. Aikhionbare, a permanent crops inspector in Benin, was suspended in 1947 until the police investigation of charges of extortion and official corruption were made known. 192 In 1945, an inspector in the Warri Province was charged with accepting a bribe. Though he "got away with it" when called before the authorities, he was relieved of duty, admitting he had been let off lightly. 193 Africans continued to resist by bribing inspectors or planting in secret. 194 
CONCLUSION
The Korean War created a spike in global rubber prices. Trees planted before 1945 reached maturity around the same time, and the post-war decline in Nigerian rubber exports was reversed. The industry peaked in the 1970s. Conditions for this boom had been set during the war; farmers and trading companies had gained experience, restrictive legislation had fallen into disuse, and much of the stock of trees had been planted during this period. The rubber industry in Benin is a window into wartime processes of continuity and change, and into the weaknesses of the colonial state. Initially, the Colonial Office was concerned that Nigerian rubber undermined its interests in Malaya. The Agricultural Department argued instead, due to revenue needs and the failings of its other initiatives, that no positive policies of restriction should be considered. Competing interests and a lack of coordination, however, meant that policies towards permanent crops and forestry hindered the development of rubber.
After the loss of southeast Asia, the Agriculture and Forestry Departments campaigned for maximum production. Producers were compelled, scammed, and exploited, but gained experience and a stock of capital for future use. Firms distrusted a trade they knew little about, initially lost money, struggled for labour, and chafed against grades, prices, and quality standards. Many of these difficulties survived the uneasy transition from war into the years that followed.
